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External Statebuilding and Transnational Networks: The 
Limits of the Civil Society Approach  
 
Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic 
 
In: Kostovicova, Denisa and Glasius, Marlies, (eds.) Bottom-Up Politics: an Agency-
Centred Approach to Globalization. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK, pp. 93-
111. 
 
Introduction  
 With its focus on networks1, Ghani and Lockhart’s recent book adds a new 
perspective to the actor-centred literature on post-conflict state building. Accounting 
for the challenges of external efforts to build sustainable states in the aftermath of 
conflict in war torn regions from the Western Balkans through to Iraq, to Afghanistan 
and East Timor, scholars have studied the role of local elites as opposed to civil 
society. Most recently, the scholarship on actors operating in post-conflict 
environments has expanded its reach to include private business and multi-stake 
holder partnerships. We argue that the network perspective, which brings to the 
forefront the reality of multiple actors and their complex relationship in the post-
conflict environment, poses a particular challenge for the scholars of state building.  
 This emerging field is characterized by the blurring of the conceptual and empirical 
boundaries which facilitate political science inquiry and explanation. Networks 
operating in post-conflict zones do not neatly fit any of the ‘traditional’ divides: local 
versus global, state versus non-state, public versus private, licit versus illicit, and so 
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on. Furthermore, the persistence and adaptation of these networks from conflict to 
post-conflict bifurcates one of the basic premises of peacebuilding: that of a clear 
break between war and peace that enables post-conflict peacebuilding effort to start. It 
provides critical evidence for the ‘new war’ approach to conflict (Kaldor, 1999), 
which posits that the implication of ‘network war’ as a linea diferentia of 
contemporary warfare is a war to peace continuum, a development that the academic 
and policy communities have been only slowly coming to grips with.    
 The aim of this chapter is to explore the analytic utility of the bottom-up approach 
from the perspective of transnational networks, and demonstrate its analytical 
purchase and limitation in the study of post-conflict state building. We focus on some 
of the key characteristics of networks that carry particular weight in accounting for the 
difficult process of state building in post-Communist, post-conflict context. While 
these show that the bottom-up approach is key to understanding their emergence 
during the conflict, it is less capable of explaining their adaptation and persistence in 
the post-conflict period. Hence, the chapter first charts the inclusion of civil society in 
the state building literature, and the limits of the approach within that literature. It 
then goes on to examine the process, the actors and the dynamics behind the blurring 
of the boundaries between public and private, internal and external, legal and illegal 
that is characteristic of transnational networks operating as actors in their own right in 
post-conflict zones. The chameleon-like quality of networks members that operate 
both as a part of civil society and as a part of the state is illustrated with reference to a 
Bosnian Croat and a Bosnian Serb transnational network created during the Bosnian 
war from 1992-1995.  
 While this study of transnational networks relies on a single case study and within 
case study comparison, and therefore has findings that are limited in their 
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generalizability, it does nonetheless aspire to speak to broader field of statebuilding. 
In particular, it develops a model that can be tested in comparable cases of conflict 
following the collapse of a strong and illiberal state marked by the contestation for 
power among several sectarian groups, as is the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 
addition, it makes a case for a comparison of the transnationalization of conflict in the 
post-colonial context, such as Africa, and the post-communist context, as in the 
former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, and their legacy for post-conflict state building, 
given their distinct pre-conflict experience of statehood (cf. Kostovicova and Bojicic-
Dzelilovic, 2009, p. 4-5). 
 
The bottom-up critique of post-conflict statebuilding  
 External involvement in humanitarian assistance, conflict resolution and post-
conflict reconstruction in conflict zones, from Haiti through to the Balkans and the 
sub-Saharan Africa to Iraq and Afghanistan, has become a norm in the post-Cold War 
world. Understanding distant conflict as an immediate threat in the increasingly 
globalized and interconnected world has shifted the focus of outside engagement in 
local state building. A panoply of external actors, including international and regional 
organisations, states and NGOs, have undertaken governance of a ‘comprehensive 
nature’ in the aftermath of conflict the world over (Caplan, 2005). The establishment 
of legitimate political authority, understood as a democratic, accountable and self-
sustainable state, was presumed to be a condition for security both within the 
boundaries of the post-conflict state and beyond.  
 Two decades into ‘new interventionism’, the relationship between peacebuilding 
and statebuilding is ‘complicated, contingent and context-dependent’ (Call, 2008, p. 
3). Consequently, the original premise of statebuilding as an answer to conflict has 
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given way in the literature on the subject to the dilemmas and contradictions attendant 
in the process (Paris and Sisk, 2009). Of particular interest in this chapter is a recent 
shift in the scholarship towards a relational understanding of statebuilding, which 
emanates from the understanding of legitimacy as critical to the success of the 
enterprise. Recognition that a popular endorsement and buy-in into the statebuilding 
project is necessary has heralded a critique of a top down state building. The 
introduction of the ‘people’ and their politics as shapers of the statebuilding outcome 
follows the elaboration of legitimacy in these types of external interventions.  
 Statebuilding interventions are undertakings by external actors on behalf and in 
trust of the populations that are their beneficiaries. Therefore, the statebuilding 
exercise has an external and internal dimension of legitimacy (Knoll, 2008, p. 294-8, 
Papagianni, 2008, p. 51-5). External legitimacy derives from the legal framework and 
normative justification of the statebuilding project. Internal legitimacy is constructed 
by local beneficiaries. The state under construction (the external statebuilders’ 
project) is appraised by the local population against the benchmark of representation 
in terms of political community and that of its ability to provide public goods. These 
are referred to as input and output legitimacy (Scharpf, 1999). Kaldor refines the 
notion of input legitimacy as political legitimacy that ‘includes a process of 
accountability and responsiveness to public debate that goes beyond formal 
participation and representation’ (2009, p. 186). 
 Such a multifaceted conceptualization of legitimacy has opened up space for the 
bottom-up approach that is not just a complementary strategy to top down state 
building. On the contrary, the very credibility of the project rests on its endorsement 
by the local population. In this vein, Chandler’s (2006) condemnation of statebuilding 
as ‘empire in denial’, itself an extension of a critique of state building as neo-
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imperialism, has at its core the evasion of accountability from the local population for 
the highly intrusive external governance. By contrast, recognizing the constraints of 
external statebuilding that by definition is illegitimate to the extent that it 
‘compromises sovereignty to create sovereignty’ (Woodward, 2001), others have 
explored how legitimacy can be constructed taking into account the views of 
recipients of statebuilding. The significance of including the ‘locals’ in the 
consultative process has been related both to the issue of consent (Knoll, 2007) and to 
effectiveness of governance (Zaum, 2007, p. 238-9, cf. Chesterman, 2004, p. 129), 
both being constitutive of legitimacy. Others have gone further. Kaplan calls for a 
new approach to statebuilding to start from the bottom up, and implies recognition of 
traditional institutions instead of imposition of a Western-style top down structure 
(2010).  
 The consideration of local voices in the statebuilding enterprise includes two 
understandings of the bottom-up. Following a distinction between the external 
interveners and beneficiaries of state building, one understanding of the bottom-up 
includes the locals—as opposed to foreigners—conflating local elites and local civil 
society (Kostovicova, 2008). The other understanding of bottom-up politics places 
emphasis on civil society. It is cognisant of contradictory processes in the post-
conflict political landscape where elected representatives may not necessarily be the 
best guardians of people’s interests. Paddy Ashdown, the former High Representative 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, describes a lesson he received from a Serb refugee in 
Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb-dominated entity. The refugee told Ashdown that the 
government was ‘ripping off its own Serb refugees’. Instead of supporting their return 
home, it diverted the international aid to support Serbs from Bosnian Muslim areas to 
stay in RS, and, thus, solidify ethnic cleansing (Ashdown, 2007, p. 234-5).  
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 Consequently, the biggest challenge facing outsiders has been who should be 
included in the public participation and consultative processes (Papagianni, 2008, p. 
61-7, cf. Bhatia, 2007). Scholars have turned to local civil society for an answer to the 
question of why the construction of legitimate political authority in post-conflict 
contexts has proved elusive thus far, and in particular why there has been resistance 
on the part of political elites to statebuilding. This inquiry has shown that civil 
society’s constructive contribution to liberal peacebuilding and state building is 
potentially multi-faceted but cannot be taken for granted. The complex role of civil 
society actors after conflict, and specifically in relation to state building, is closely 
linked to a range of positions they occupy in relation to war—where some oppose 
wars but some also favour it (Kaldor, Kostovicova and Said, 2007). 
 The multiple roles that civil society plays in post-conflict contexts correspond with 
different and not necessarily competing definitions of civil society. Their diversity can 
thus be seen to match the diversity of aims which civil society can help expedite: from 
forging interethnic reconciliation and assisting post-conflict democratization to 
monitoring the state and service provision. Hence civil society, conceived as a lively 
non-state sphere rich with associational life, can contribute to democratization: in the 
Tocquevillian tradition; in Putnam’s sense where the creation of social capital can 
contribute to development; and in a Habermasian sense where civil society is 
understood as a space for civility, tolerance and debate. Thus civil society can 
potentially counteract divisive sectarianism (cf. Kostovicova, 2010, p. 371). Spurke 
summarizes the complexity of approaches to analyzing civil society under two 
headings: actor-centred approaches that prioritise the performance and features of 
civil society actors, and functional approaches that hone in on the functions that civil 
society performs (2010, p. 20-5). However, civil society can both contribute to and 
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undermine peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts. Therefore, although 
conceptualised as a space for civility, tolerance and debate (and thus an alternative 
route for restoring trust in multiethnic communities after the conflict) ethnic divisions 
have often been replicated and reinforced at the civil society level, as for example in 
Kosovo (Devic, 2006). Civil society, or more precisely its illiberal or ‘uncivil’ 
segments, have emerged as an obstacle to interethnic reconciliation (Kostovicova, 
2006). They have thus underwritten rather than ameliorated the institutionalisation of 
ethnicity, as in Iraq or Bosnia-Herzegovina. Similarly, its role as a generator of 
political alternatives, as a monitor of government and state (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 
18, Brinkerhoff, 2007), and as provider of policies and services enabled by external 
actors has been compromised in post-conflict contexts. Scholars have attributed civil 
society’s inability to shape governance outcomes variously to: historical legacies of 
illiberal regimes (Howard, 2003); the sidelining of indigenous social organizations 
due to the international actors’ bias towards engaging with NGOs (Howell and Pearce, 
2001, p. 114, Pouligny, 2005); and the ‘projectization’ of civil society, whereby 
externally-driven policies of civil society building result in the proliferation of NGOs, 
as driven by donors’ priorities (Sampson, 1996).  
 The state-society relations perspective to statebuilding has certainly opened up an 
insightful analytical avenue. It shifted attention to the non-state explanation for 
challenges of building democratic and sustainable states after conflict. Specifically, it 
revealed that a combination of a weak state and weak civil society—that is, a double 
weakness—has proved particularly resistant to the transformation from a fragmented 
and exclusive state to consolidated and inclusive post-conflict statehood. Yet this 
analytical turn has also revealed its limitations. It has stopped short of questioning the 
very binaries, which initially facilitated the emergence of the bottom-up analysis as an 
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alternative approach. It has not questioned either the local-global or the public-private 
distinction. Richmond argues that in reality state building confronts alterity and 
hybridity (2010, p. 173). The transnational network approach, elaborated in the next 
section, captures this methodological in-betweenness. It offers a conceptual departure 
from the bottom-up civil society approach and demonstrates that binaries are 
analytically untenable in the post-conflict context.   
 
The transnational network approach 
 The post-Cold War era has been characterized by proliferation of armed conflicts 
in which local rule has been challenged by various non-state armed groups, such as 
rebels, insurgents and warlords. Whilst commonly referred to as ‘internal wars’ or 
‘civil wars’ in the absence of organized inter-state armed violence, these conflicts 
have been far from self-contained armed struggles. In fact, a distinctive feature of 
contemporary wars has been their transnationalization in scale, scope and complexity 
(Kaldor, 1999, Keen, 2008, Duffield, 2001, Eilstrup Sangiovanni, 2005). Several 
dynamics have been at work behind this process.  
 One concerns the ideological/political drivers of conflict. Most contemporary 
conflicts tend to have explicit identity overtones, which have worked to mobilize 
diasporas as a traditional transnational actor engaging in all stages and aspects of 
contemporary warfare. Thus, the role of diasporas has augmented and diversified; no 
longer are diasporas primarily acting as a funder, prudent investor in local economy 
and lobbyist for a homeland’s political and economic causes, but it is also involved in 
combat, participates in local governance and pursues other less overt and less 
palatable causes in a way that can derail peacebuilding efforts.  
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 The second dynamic leading to transnationalization of contemporary conflict is 
related to the funding strategies of armed groups in the context when the monopoly of 
violence no longer exists and the depressed local economy cannot provide sufficient 
resources for war making. Financing violence in a global era forces armed groups, 
whether non-state or official military force, to search for alternative resources to wage 
and sustain war, which often involves resorting to illegal and criminal activities 
(Berdal and Wennmann, 2010, p. 191). These have become the core of a war 
economy. This in itself implies linking up regionally and globally with organized 
crime as another typical transnational actor. Throughout conflict zones the world over 
there is ample evidence of expansion in transborder trade involving smuggling of 
legal goods, but also in outright criminal activity involving people, arms, precious 
stones, rare minerals and drugs trafficking as a result of both an active involvement of 
armed groups as well as the increasing presence of organized crime itself seeking 
opportunity to extract profit in a fluid legal framework of conflict-affected states. 
Consequently, the most important channel through which those countries become 
integrated into the global economic and financial flows is through a myriad of 
informal and criminal activities of a war economy.  
 Lastly, contemporary conflicts are often associated with humanitarian emergencies 
as complex crisis endangering the local population so that no single agency can 
provide an effective response (Keen, 2008). Hence, a plethora of international actors 
tend to be involved in various aspects of ameliorating the impact of armed violence 
and in working towards its termination—from humanitarian agencies, bilateral 
donors, and foreign governments to transnational nongovernmental organisations.  
 The multiplicity of diverse types of actors (including the prominent role of 
traditional transnational actors such as diasporas, organized crime and a range of non 
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governmental organizations) in contemporary warfare is only one facet of its distinct 
(transnational) nature. The other, and by far more crucial one in terms of its 
implications for peacebuilding, is the changing nature of political authority through 
the involvement and/or acquiesce of official military, security forces and other 
government actors in illegal and criminal activities and collusion with their agents.2 
As a result the criminal, conflict, business and corruption agendas of various actors 
tend to converge through the conduct of the war economy, which results in their 
extensive collaboration and hence the creation of networks. In some cases a political-
business-military-criminal nexus is created through networking, which from its 
dominant position is able to further enlarge the network by co-opting other social 
actors, by using patronage and award, and also through coercion and threat.  
 The involvement of the agents of the state in the networks of actors pursuing their 
goals through violence is the critical moment that accounts for the promulgation of 
transnational networks into a force that shapes the transformation of post-conflict 
societies from within and usurps the consolidation of the post-conflict state 
(Kostovicova & Bojicic- Dzelilovic, 2008). The sheer diversity of actors involved 
makes these networks both local and global3 in their scope. Their operations span 
state and society, public and private domains. Often, their activity is most vibrant 
within  ‘regional war complexes’ (Pugh et al, 2004) which serve as conduits and as an 
interface with global actors and flows, and where proximity and pre-war links make 
mobilization of people, resources and ideological support to networks that much 
easier. The networks are able to thrive in the context in which informal and criminal 
practice associated with their agency remains condoned by the wider society in which 
they are anchored, and where opportunities for securing livelihoods and 
developmental prospects on a larger scale are constrained. 
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 The presence of ‘criminal networks’ (Reno, 2009) – a term that conjures complex 
relations which develop through violent pursuit of profit and power under the veil of 
war—is not always and in every post-conflict site as pronounced as the political-
business-military-criminal nexus suggests. But what is characteristic of various 
concrete local manifestations of transnational networks that survive the conflict is 
precisely the conflation of a variety of interests and motives driving their participants. 
A single actor can pursue several motives, for example personal wealth and power, 
and actors’ motives can—and often do—change due to opportunities that violence 
creates so that military personnel turn into criminals, or criminals become politicians. 
Network members move in and out of public office, never abandoning its control. 
Further, a cursory look at the personal biography of any prominent node in such 
networks shows the impossibility of clearly deciphering those actors’ roles, and 
motives as for example criminals, diasporas, warriors, businessmen or public office 
holders. Networks are held together by a unity of purpose; their participants share an 
interest in preserving wealth, status, power, authority and influence acquired through 
the engagement in the war economy but also impunity where crimes had been 
involved. In so far as war entails social transformation (Duffield, 2001), as David 
Keen suggests, ‘Where conflict has elevated some groups above the law, they may be 
reluctant to let go of their new status—a significant motive for keeping conflict going 
in some form. The point of war may be precisely in the legitimacy it confers on 
actions that in peacetime would be punishable as crimes” (Keen 2008, p. 19-20).   
 Close links between various actors participating in transnational networks are 
cultivated after the end of conflict, especially since often wartime actors become 
public office holders. The bonds created through activities of the war economy do not 
sever easily so that the links with the global (informal) economy and its protagonists 
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are sustained. Furthermore, the difficult post-conflict economics, which drives 
informality, provides a fertile ground for networks to exploit the skills and resources 
acquired through the conduct of the war economy and adapt to new opportunities 
created through internationally assisted post-conflict recovery. Contemporary warfare 
ravages infrastructure and production facilities, which set against the territorial 
fragmentation left behind by political contestation of various armed factions, create 
formidable obstacles to the recovery of regulated (formal) economy. Economic 
reforms of deregulation and liberalization pursued with an aim to reintegrate those 
economies into the global market place provide further incentives to informality, not 
least by weakening the state’s capacity as public goods provider. This enables 
networks’ strategic dominance secured through the control of state office, and allows 
access to resources—material, human and informational—necessary to sustain the 
network and its extraordinary capacity to adapt in a complex peacebuilding context. 
The role of the particular actors (nodes) in this process is instrumental, as the 
portrayal of the two networks created during Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1995 
presented in the following section illustrates. 
 
The Bosnian Croat network: Ante Jelavic node 
 Ante Jelavic joined the Bosnian Croat military force (Croatian Defense Council, or 
HVO) as a low ranking Yugoslav Army Official. Within months, he was promoted to 
a rank of General in the army of an unofficial para-state Bosnian Croats had set up to 
challenge Bosnian statehood. His position as the helm of the Grude Logistics Centre, 
the central hub for channelling resources to fund HVO military (and civilian) 
activities during the 1992-1995 war, provided him with strong personal power and 
influence he used to mobilize the people and resources which would play an important 
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role in securing the network’s firm grip (Slobodna Bosna, 29/1/2004) on all spheres of 
life in the Bosnian Croat-majority areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina along the war-peace 
continuum. The Centre was a site facilitating activities through which Bosnian Croat 
military, political and commercial elites mingled with criminals, mercenaries and 
similar actors combining combat with the deliberate killing and expulsion of civilians, 
looting, theft and extortion.4 Their common purpose was framed as the establishment 
of the Bosnian Croat political entity through armed struggle. To that end, support 
from Croatia5 proper was vital, including a supply of resources through the Grude 
Centre, where those resources comingled with proceeds from illegal transborder trade 
taking place under the cover of the war. When Jelavic left the Centre to become the 
Federation Defence Minister, he was succeeded by his trusted cadre, who helped in 
using the assets of the Centre to set up an engineering company serving partly as a 
front to continue payment of wages to Bosnian Croat demobilized soldiers (Jelavic 
Court transcript) thus securing their continuing loyalty. The company in question—
Monitor M6—would become one of the key sites for various activities the network 
pursued in order to strengthen its economic standing and boost the personal wealth of 
its prominent members, including Jelavic himself.  
 After the Grude Centre was closed, Jelavic’s position in the ministry was crucial 
for some of its cadre’s dispersal through various public institutions to enable the 
network’s survival (Dani, 14/10/2005). Those institutions included the Federation 
Defence Ministry but also informal ones created during the life of the Bosnian Croat 
para-state, which continued to exist under the scenario of ethnic-parallelism7 in the 
Federation institutions well into the 2000s. The network’s control extended to other 
key economic and societal Bosnian Croat institutions through the control of key 
appointments. Public companies (for example telecommunications and utilities), 
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major manufacturers of aluminium Aluminij Mostar, Mostar University, the Catholic 
Church; tax and payment offices and so on were all part of the network mobilized by 
the inner group centred on Jelavic in his role as Defence Minister and later on as a 
member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina State Presidency (Jelavic Court transcript, 
Slobodna Bosna 19/2/2004).  
 The post-war period was a time of profound uncertainty regarding Bosnia- 
Herzegovina’s political reorganization and the Bosnian Croat position therein. 
Jelavic’s role in this period was pivotal in setting up the structures aimed at securing 
the network’s economic and political survival As a Minister, Jelavic helped set up 
Hercegovina Holding, a commercial enterprise at the heart of which was 
Hercegovacka Banka, the bank through which the funding from Croatia and the 
Federation budget was channelled to the Bosnian Croat military structures. As 
Defence Minister Jelavic was de facto the one having civilian oversight of those 
structures. The network’s penetration into all key Bosnian Croat commercial and 
societal institutions allowed those elites gathered around the Jelavic node to move in 
and out of various public offices, while never severing commercial links, which were 
sustained either through personal involvement or that of their family members and 
close associates. Privileged access to Defence Ministry contracts and bank credit were 
instrumental in expanding the network’s reach and its economic base. The network’s 
adaption to peacetime circumstances involved a shift to more informal rather than 
illegal and outright criminal activities pursued in the course of the conflict. Thus tax 
and customs evasion, irregularities in the public procurement, money laundering, 
smuggling of high tariff goods and those stolen from across Europe were common 
practice and were made possible by the network’s regional and transnational links. 
The network’s scope of action did not concern boosting its economic and political 
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capital only; it also invested in symbolic acts aimed to rekindle ethnic sentiments and 
preserve ethnic cohesion created through war; this involved for example securing 
funds for the defence of the Bosnian Croats indicted by the International War crime 
Tribunal on war crimes charges and for the maintenance of their families. 
 
The Bosnian Serb network: Momcilo Mandic node 
 In April 1992 Momcilo Mandic was appointed Justice Minister in the self-
proclaimed Republika Srpska—the Serb-controlled area—immediately after the 
outbreak of conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the years leading up to the war, he had 
demonstrated his ability to combine public office and private business. He was a 
judge in the Sarajevo Municipal Court, having previously been employed by the local 
police, whilst running a chain of retail shops, and also co-owning a pizzeria in the 
city. His rise up the echelons of the Bosnian Serb wartime political leadership allowed 
him to establish political links with the Bosnian Serbs leaders as well as with those in 
Serbia. These were critical in the establishment of a system of informal economy that, 
along with its transnational links, survived the Bosnian war. So has the ideological 
platform framed by Serbian nationalism, that—beyond the motives of private 
enrichment—formally united the network, around the Mandic node, that included 
state officials, secret service, businessmen, at times members of paramilitary units, as 
well as reaching to links with war criminals and organized crime.  
 The beginning of the war and the business opportunity it offered beyond the writ of 
the law did not escape Mandic. Having capitalized on police links, he is thought to 
have been in possession of hundreds of Bosnia-Herzegovina passports and other 
identity documents that were fetching thousands of German Marks (DM) as people 
sought to flee the wanton violence unleashed by the war. Mandic was also at the heart 
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of a car smuggling affair from the Volkswagen TAS (abbreviated from Tvornica 
Automobila Sarajevo) factory located in the Bosnian Serb-controlled part of Sarajevo, 
which provided not just profit but strengthened his position within the regional 
political-criminal structures. The operation, which involved appropriation and transfer 
of cars into Serbia and Montenegro included members of the Bosnian Serb and 
Serbia’s political leadership as well as paramilitary units that crossed over from 
Serbia to fight in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dani, 17/02/2006).8 In late 1992 by the 
decision of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), the ruling RS party, Mandic was 
relocated to Belgrade to head the Republika Srpska Government Bureau—an 
institution akin to the Bosnian Serb para-state’s embassy. In fact, the Bureau was a 
hub of activities aimed to support Bosnian Serb war effort and its leadership’s self-
government agenda in the post-war period through the links with Serbia’s political 
and military leadership (Vreme, 2/2/2006). Overseeing it allowed Mandic to use his 
public office position to advance the standing of the network, and shore up the 
political and economic fortunes of its members. Some of the key people in the Bureau 
were Mandic’s close allies. For example, the Bureau’s Deputy Director was a former 
Head of the Criminal Police of the RS, who carried out intelligence tasks for Mandic. 
Other employees included Mandic’s fellow villager Jovo Djogo, a former high 
ranking military commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, who was eventually charged 
as the ringleader of a group protecting Ratko Mladic, the most wanted (and still at 
large) Bosnian Serb war crimes indictee (Slobodna Bosna, 6/9/2007). 
 Having moved to Belgrade, Mandic left behind a network of loyal individuals 
positioned throughout RS intelligence, police, local government and even justice 
system structures. Mandic’s brother was a long-serving Republika Srpska Deputy 
Minister of Justice shielding Mandic from the threat of persecution as he embarked on 
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his dubious business dealings. The political and financial capital accumulated during 
the conflict allowed Mandic to become a key player once privatization got underway 
after the war. In 1995, he set up a Belgrade branch of the Bosnian Commercial Bank, 
Privredna Banka Sarajevo, together with the then Bosnian Serb Vice-President, 
Momcilo Krajisnik. The bank was used for transfers of pensions and retirement 
benefits earned abroad to Bosnian Serbs but also murky dealings involving for 
example deposits by Chinese tradesmen related to alleged money laundering 
operations (Tony Robinson, Court transcripts). Mandic was to become the biggest 
shareholder of its mother company Privredna Banka Srpsko Sarajevo (Bank), also 
established in 1995, through complex dealings that involved the network around him. 
The largest depositors of the Bank were the RS government and its various funds 
(such as the housing and employment funds). Under the SDS directive, public 
companies, local governments and even orphanage funds also held their deposits with 
the Bank (Dani, 16/6/2006). Not unlike the Hercegovacka Banka in the Bosnian Croat 
areas, the assets of the Bank were used by the political elite of the SDS to obtain loans 
under favourable conditions and open private firms, as well as for other ends. Mandic 
himself used the Bank to prop up his company ManCo located in Bijeljina, through a 
series of loans approved on favourable conditions, in breach of due diligence and 
without collateral (Tony Robinson witness statement ) which allowed him to become 
the biggest shareholder of the Bank and eventually its owner. The same pattern of the 
Bank’s capital being used to acquire shares in the Bank, through dedicated front 
companies, can be observed in the operation of this network. One of the key 
companies in those transactions was Matres—a company set up in 1998 by the 
municipality of East Sarajevo (the part of Sarajevo that came under Bosnian Serb 
control during the war) with the assets from the RS commodity reserves. The 
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document establishing Matres was signed by the then Republika Srpska government’s 
envoy to the East Sarajevo Mirko Sarovic, who subsequently became the mayor of 
East Sarajevo, the President of the Republika Srpska government and a member of the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency (Court transcript Mandic). Mandic was the head of 
Matres’s supervisory board. The transactions aimed at acquiring the shares of the 
Bank would involve Matres receiving a loan from the Bank (again, in breach of due 
procedure), which Matres would then use to acquire shares in (mainly majority state-
owned) companies that were the Bank’s shareholders. Though Matres was a state-
owned company, involved in complex dealings with both the state and privately 
owned firms, RS political leadership was provided with access to the Bank’s assets.9 
Among the Bank’s preferred clients who failed to repay the loans was the SDS- 
owned Spektra, which funded the SDS election campaigns. Mandic was a staunch 
supporter of the SDS even after its demise from power in 1997: he funded the defence 
of Momcilo Krajisnik in the Hague (Cvijanovic, 2005), paid bail for Gojko Klickovic 
(former RS prime minister) with the Bank’s money, and supported the hiding of 
Radovan Karadzic as well as some of the top SDS cadre (Mandic court transcript, 
Ilustrovana politika, 23/3/2002).  
 Mandic’s (often informal and illegal) business dealings spanned finance, trade 
(including the lucrative business of importing oil), industry and catering. They were 
facilitated by his close links to political-military-business-criminal circles in Serbia 
and Montenegro, the two countries whose citizenship (besides Bosnian) Mandic 
enjoyed. It was those links that helped him escape several attempts to charge him with 
corruption and crime, including war crime charges (B92, 8/9/2009).10 Mandic made 
an effort to carve out a prominent position in Serbia’s and Montenegro’s social 
circles. This included a prestigious directorship of the Belgrade handball team and a 
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membership in the supervisory board of the Handball Association of Serbia and 
Montenegro, extending the outreach of patronage-based relations.  
 In sum, wartime dealings of the Bosnian-Serb transnational networks defy 
‘orthodox’ analysis along public-private or licit and illicit-axes. According to Svarm, 
‘[i]n that bundle of interwoven interests a clear line between policemen and criminals, 
state institutions and mafia clans was lost. Everyone could be simultaneously both on 
one and on the other side’ (1997). Furthermore, the links between network members 
multiplied due to criss-crossing ethnic, kin, wartime and business-interests. For 
example, Mandic was relying on the services of the wartime Chief of Special Police 
unit of RS, who rose to a rank of the General. He was also Mandic’s witness at a 
wedding, and was employed in different capacities by Mandic, including as a security 
guard in his restaurant.   
 
Conclusion 
 The transnational network perspective on statebuilding challenges what has 
recently emerged as a mainstream answer to the question of legitimacy associated 
with external interventions. Scholars have posited that external statebuilding policies 
have not been able to tackle effectively parallel sites of authority that maintain 
autonomy from the post-conflict state. Hence, the problem of legitimacy has been 
located in the existence of structures that are independent from and in competition 
with the state. The application of the bottom-up approach has highlighted the problem 
posed by enduring local legitimacy of groups and networks that are key protagonists 
in the conflict. Ultimately, it raised the question of ‘bottom-up statebuilding’ that 
comes with the political dilemma and cost of their inclusion or exclusion from formal 
state institutions (Reno, 2008). However, such explanations are built on the 
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conceptual dichotomy between the state and society. Therefore, they demonstrate the 
limitation of the bottom-up approach. 
 The transnational networks perspective portrays a rather different and more 
complex reality of the existing configurations of power in particular post-conflict 
spaces. The analysis of the two networks forged in the Bosnian war demonstrates that 
a neat division between the public and private, licit and illicit, local and global is 
untenable in the post-conflict context. Poligny notes that political, economic and 
military entrepreneurs, as well as indigenous civil societies (including formal social 
organizations and religious and community networks), are involved in fluid, 
crosscutting and interconnected networks whose politics, interests and perspectives 
are not necessarily deducible from their position in the local political order (2006, p. 
42-95). Our transnational network perspective demonstrates that actors comprising the 
network at one and the same time operate as purveyors of public and private interests, 
deriving from licit and illicit practices, and whose local impact is framed by global 
dynamics. Such conceptualization of transnational networks as operating at the 
intersection of the state and society has a rather different policy consequence than one 
that sees networks as an alternative to the state.  
 In fact, to think of transnational networks as an alternative to the state assumes that 
the states are willing partners in ending illegitimate practices and sanctioning their 
protagonists. By contrast, our conceptualization of networks, which requires looking 
beyond the state-society dichotomy, raises the question of the transformed nature of 
the post-conflict state in a global era. This is the state in which the distinction between 
the public and private, and legal and illegal is blurred. The state itself, which in the 
course of the war became deeply enmeshed with various non-state (including 
criminal) structures, local and transnational through the conduct of the war economy 
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is involved in violating the very rules it sets and is supposed to enforce. State agents 
in what becomes a functionally weak state have an interest in maintaining the status 
quo while preventing its failure. To keep it in a state of persistent weakness, 
transnational networks (of which state agents are a part) focus on mobilizing and 
appropriating both local and international resources. The local state underwritten by 
those networks maintains a degree of legitimacy among the public through its 
capacity to provide a modicum of public goods within a framework in which 
ideological cohesiveness rekindled by their activity is paramount for the survival of 
their rule. Ultimately, when it comes to external state building, the undertaking should 
focus on the deconstruction of structures with little interest in building a system of 
legitimate rule, which is based on the commitment and capacity to mobilize 
developmental resources to the benefit of general public. 
                                                 
Notes 
1 We use throughout the paper the terms ‘networks’ and ‘transnational networks’ 
interchangeably. 
2 Extraction of resources from the local population, through violence and extortion is 
also a strategy to generate resources for warmaking. 
3 This feature of transnational networks, their deep entrenchment within local power 
structures and the ability to exploit their international mobility are, according to Naim, 
what gives them an advantage over local or national efforts to combat them (2005, 
34). 
4 Through those activities complex relations were formed which did not end with the 
termination of the armed conflict. 
5 Importantly, a crucial say in the formulation of Croatia’s policy towards Bosnia- 
Herzegovina belonged to a handful of Croatia’s officials who hailed from 
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Herzegovina. Gojko Susak, a long time émigré made a defence minister upon his 
return to Croatia in 1991, was by far the most prominent figure among them. 
6 The bulk of Monitor M activity set up as state-owned company took place in a 
foreign country, i.e. Croatia. 
7 Those parallel institutions were important both in pragmatic and symbolic terms. 
They enabled the network to continue to wield its power despite formal progress in 
building common institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and the central state; 
at the same time, they kept the aspiration of having ‘their own’ state alive among the 
Bosnian Croat population. 
8 The trial of the Serb-paramilitary unit ‘Yellow Wasps’ (Zute ose), that was charged 
with criminal activities during the war, revealed the details of the operation. The unit 
comprised of the volunteers of the Serbian Radical Party, from Serbia whose leader is 
currently in the dock in the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY). This operation is illustrative of a widespread practice of asset stripping and 
looting in which both official and paramilitary force in collusion or with direct 
participation of the top political leadership engaged during the war. 
9 Those assets included funding from Serbia proper in ‘support of strengthening Serb 
Sarajevo (East Sarajevo)’ but also to support Radovan Karadzic, a fugitive from the 
ICTY (Mandic court transcript). 
10 This was obvious even in the most basic sense of having been able to move freely 
between two (Serbia and Montenegro were one country until 2006) countries to 
escape legal sanctions as Ante Jelavic did.  
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